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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Some modification of the code of legal ethics may be necessary
to resolve this conflict of interests.4 ' As Justice Traynor well noted,
"Given the primary duty of the legal profession to serve the public,
the rules it establishes to govern its professional ethics must be
directed at the performance of that duty."42
John Reed Homburg
Criminal Law-Misdemeanors--Indigent's
Right to Appointed Counsel
D was charged with committing a misdemeanor. At the time of
his arraignment he alleged he was financially unable to procure
counsel. The court informed him that no counsel could be appointed
and set the date for his trial. At the trial D offered no testimony,
exhibits, or statements, and did not conduct cross-examination. He
was found guilty and sentenced to a fine or imprisonment in default
of payment. He paid the fine under protest and appealed. On appeal
he was again denied appointed counsel. D then applied to the state
supreme court for an alternative writ of mandamus. Held, writ issued
and cause remanded to determine indigency. A defendant unable
to procure counsel when he is charged with a misdemeanor punishable
by incarceration is entitled to have counsel appointed to represent
him. State v. Borst, 154 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1967).
The case raises the controversial question of the right of an indigent
misdemeanant to have counsel appointed in his behalf in a state
proceeding. The basis of such a right must come from the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution which in part provides,
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to...
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."' This provision governs
federal criminal proceedings and has been interpreted to mean that
if the defendant cannot afford to retain counsel, such counsel must
4' For several months the American Bar Association has been giving
consideration to a general revision of the statement of the standards of the
legal profession, particularly through its Special Committee on Evaluation
of Ethical Standards. See Comment, 53 A.B.AJ. 901 (1967).
42 Hildebrand v. State Bar of California, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 522, 225
P.2d 508, 519 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
' U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
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be provided by the court.2 Failure to so provide counsel renders a
subsequent conviction void.' This federal right of appointed counsel
has also been extended to cases involving misdemeanors.4
The criminal defendant's rights in state prosecutions are not as
well defined. The right to counsel was first applied only to state
criminal prosecutions for capital offenses.' This was later extended
to non-capital offenses, but then only under special circumstances.'
This "special circumstances" rule was specifically overruled by the
Supreme Court in the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright.' It
was there decided that counsel was essential in state criminal
proceedings for a fair trial and, consequently, must be provided for
the indigent. It has also been decided that the indigent defendant
has the right to appointed counsel on appeal8 and must be given a
transcript of the record on appeal.9 The important question which
remains unanswered is whether counsel must be provided in cases
involving misdemeanors.
State courts, and federal courts entertaining post-conviction
challenges to state court proceedings, have divided on the question;
some states have resolved the issue by statutes which provide for
such appointment." Among the court decisions, three distinct trends
2 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938). For the historical development of the right to counsel,
see generally Comment, Court Appointed Counsel for Indigent Misdemeanants,
6 Aiuz. L. REv. 280 (1965); 19 CASE W. REs. L. .Ev. 367 (1968).
3 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S.
275 (1941).
4 Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942). This extension applies
to all but petty offenses under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. §
3006A (1964); see also FED. R. Crnm. P. 44.
- Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
6 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
7 372 U.S. 355 (1963).
8 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Swenson v. Boslar,
386 U.S. 258 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1962).
9 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
10 MICH. STAT. ANNi. § 28.1253 (1954); S.D. CODE § 34.1901 (1939);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2002, 40-2003 (1955); W. VA. CODE ch. 62, art. 3,
§ 1 (Michie Supp. 1967). Minnesota, as pointed out in the principal case,also provides for such appointment of counsel, hut only in cases involving
felonies and gross misdemeanors. MnN. STAT. ANN. § 611.07 (1964). Two
other state courts have decided that their statutes require the appointment
of counsel in misdemeanor cases, although not expressly so provided in the
statutes. CAL. PEN. CODE § 859 (1961), In re Johnson, 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398
P. 2d 420 (1965); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 699 (McKinney 1958), People v.
Witenski, 15 N.Y. 2d 392, 207 N.E. 2d 358 (1965).
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can be seen: (1) the right to appointed counsel does not exist;" (2)
the matter is within the sound discretion of the court;'2 (3) the
right to appointed counsel does exist.' 3 To further confuse the issue,
what may be classified a misdemeanor in one state is a felony in
another and even where the denomination is the same, the punish-
ment may vary from state to state.' 4 The Supreme Court has even
confused its own position. The case of In re Gault'5 extended the
right to counsel to juvenile delinquency cases holding that the right
hinged on " . . . the seriousness of the charge and the potential
commitment .. .,6 and stating that the right exists " . . . at least
if a felony were involved. . . ."' As the court in the principal
case points out,'" this seemingly draws the line at felonies or serious
charges. On the other hand, a Maryland case'" involving the issue
of a misdemeanant's right to counsel was remanded to the Maryland
court by the Supreme Court for a disposition in conformity with
Gideon.20 Since the Maryland court had previously denied the
existence of the right, the Supreme Court apparently held the Gideon
decision applicable to misdeameanor cases, a conclusion also reached
by the court in the principal case.2 ' On three recent occasions the
Supreme Court has been presented with the opportunity to resolve this
conflict in its decisions but has refused to do so by denying certiorari
in all three cases.22
One determinative test in deciding the issue of right to appointed
counsel has been that if the crime involves a serious offense, then
" McDonald v. Moore, 353 F 2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965); Winters v. Beck,
239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W. 2d 364 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907 (1966);
Watkins v. Morris, 179 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1965); State v. Davis, 171 La. 449,
131 So. 295 (1930); City of Toledo v. Frazier, 226 N.E. 2d 777 (Ohio
1967); Brack v. State, 187 Md. 542, 51 A. 2d 171 (1947); Kissinger v. State,
147 Neb. 983, 25 N.W. 2d 829 (1947); Millinan v. State, 156 Tex. Cr. 88,
238 S.W. 2d 970 (1951); City of Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash. 2d 733, 409 P.
2d 867 (1966).
12 State v. DeJoseph, 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752 (1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 982 (1966); State v. Bennett, 266 N.C. 755, 147 S.E. 2d 237 (1966).
13 Bolkovac v. State, 229 Ind. 294, 98 N.E. 2d 250 (1951); State v. Borst
154 N.W. 2d 888 (Minn. 1967); State v. Blank, 241 Ore. 627, 405 P. 2d
373 (1965).
14 Comment, The Indigent Defendant's Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor
Cases, 19 Sw. L.J. 593, 601 (1965).
Is 387 U.S. 1 (1967), commented on in 70 W. VA. L. REV. 78 (1967).
16 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42 (1967).
' 7 Id. at 29.
18 State v. Borst, 154 N.W. 2d 888, 891 (Minn. 1967).
,9 Patterson v. State, 227 Md. 194, 175 A. 2d 746 (1961).
20 Patterson v. Warden, 372 U.S. 776 (1963).
21 State v. Borst, 154 N.W. 2d 888, 892 (Minn. 1967).
22 DeJoseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1966); Cortinez v. lournoy,
385 U.S. 925 (1966); Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966).
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counsel will be appointed.23 As the court points out in the principal
case,2" there has been no agreement among the courts as to what is a
"serious offense," and many times courts have refused to follow this
test altogether.2" Thus, it may be concluded that there is no definite
rule to follow, a conclusion necessarily reached in the principal case.2
In Borst the Minnesota court arrived at a practical solution to
the problem. It is obvious that a uniform rule cannot be made
based on the felony-misdemeanor distinction or the "serious offense"
test. The Supreme Court itself has said that" . . . any person haled
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."27 Is this not true
regardless of the crime a defendant may be charged with? Does
the crime charged have any bearing on the individual's ability to
defend himself? The obvious answers to these questions demonstrate
that the right should not be based on differences in crimes, but on
some other grounds, e.g., differences in punishment, as in the
principal case. If a person faces a possible loss of liberty by incar-
ceration, he should be entitled to a competent defense. 8
As the court points out in Borst, the problems of cost and an
insufficient number of lawyers have been raised as an argument
against providing counsel for misdemeanants.29 Several possible
solutions have been advanced in solving these problems. One is
either adopting a public defender system;30 or where one is in
existence, incorporating misdemeanors into it.3' A second solution
would be legal aid organizations. 2 Still another might be one of
23 State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 784 (1964).
24 State v. Borst, 154 N.W. 2d 888, 892 (Minn. 1967).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 893.
27 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
28 The concurring opinion in the principal case has formulated a slightly
different rule. Appointed counsel would be provided except in cases of
traffic violations and misdemeanors where incarceration is an alternative pun-
ishment. State v. Borst, 154 N.W. 2d 888, 896 (Minn. 1967) (concurring
opinion). The American Bar Association has proposed still another rule.
It provides for appointed counsel whenever punishment may involve loss of
liberty unless it is not likely that punishment will be imposed. AimneIc BAR
ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, 37
(1967). This may be the most practical rule yet proposed.
29 State v. Borst, 154 N.W. 2d 888, 894 (Minn. 1967).
30 See Generally Byrd, ASSISTANCE TO THE INDIGENT PERSON CHARGED
WITH CIUvm, 2 GA S.B.J. 197.
31 This was a solution advanced by the court in the principal case. State
v. Borst, 154 N.W. 2d 888, 895 (Minn. 1967) (dictum).
32 A SPEcIAL COmmnIaTEE OF TH ASSOCIATION OF Tm BAR OF THE C=Y
OF NEw YORK A ND THE NATioNAL LEGAL Am AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION,
EQuAL JUSTICE FOR T'HE ACCUSED, 68 (1959).
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three provided for in the federal court system.3 These include
representation by private attorneys, attorneys furnished by the bar,
or a system containing a combination of both of these. Of course,
these solutions would only provide attorneys, not their fees. No one
solution appears to be better than others. Whatever the source or
funding for the adopted plan, it must be remembered that the right
of the individual to adequately defend himself against a possible loss
of liberty " . . . is too sacred a right to be sacrificed on the altar of
expedience."34
John Charles Lobert
Evidence-Expert Witnesses-Qualification of Specialist
as Expert Witness in Medical Malpractice
P, experiencing vision loss in his right eye, consulted D, an oph-
thalmologist. D informed P that he had a cataract formation on the
eye and advised a corrective operation, which was performed in
August of 1962. After the operation P made periodic visits to the
office of D where he was told each time that his progress was normal.
Though D continually assured P that he would recover his vision, P
continued to suffer from vision loss in his right eye. Finally, in
May, 1963, D told P that he had retina trouble in the right eye
and that he could do nothing to improve his vision. Subsequently, in
February, 1965, P, having trouble with his left eye, went to X, a
different specialist. X performed a cataract operation on the left
eye in March, 1965, and informed P that more than half of the iris
of the right eye was missing and that his eye was permanently
damaged. In May, 1965, P brought a malpractice action in the
Court of Common Pleas in Kanawha County, West Virginia. Part
of P's evidence was the expert testimony by deposition of Z, an
ophtalmologist from New York. After P rested his case D moved for
and obtained a directed verdict on the grounds that the cause of
action was barred by the pertinent statute of limitations. P appealed
and the circuit court reversed; but D was sustained on his cross
assignment of error, the circuit court holding the testimony of Z
inadmissible. The case was remanded for retrial, but P appealed.
Held the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed in part and remanded.
33 The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(a) (1964).
34 State v. Borst, 154 N.W. 2d 888, 895 (Minn. 1967) (dictum).
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